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A symmetric 1 → 2 quantum cloning machine (QCM) is presented that provides high-fidelity
copies with 0.90 ≤ F ≤ 0.95 for all pure (single-qubit) input states from a given meridian of the
Bloch sphere. Emphasize is placed especially on the states of the (so-called) Eastern meridian, that
includes the computational basis states |0〉 , |1〉 together with the diagonal state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
for which suggested cloning transformation is shown to be optimal. In addition, we also show how
this QCM can be utilized for eavesdropping in Bennett’s B92 protocol for quantum key distribution
with a substantial higher success rate than obtained for universal or equatorial quantum copying.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to copy information is fundamental for
many processes in distributing and dealing with data.
While classical information can often be copied many
times without any significant loss, the cloning of quantum
information is seriously restricted by the laws of quan-
tum mechanics. This limitation is known today as the
non-cloning theorem [1] and has found its applications
in quite different fields of quantum information theory,
such as quantum computation [2, 3] and quantum cryp-
tography [3, 4].
In processing quantum information, formally, any de-
vice that provides for M unknown input states of a given
system N (> M) output states (of the same or some
analogue systems) is called a M → N quantum cloning
machine (QCM). To ensure a proper quantum behaviour,
such machines are usually represented as unitary trans-
formations; they are called symmetric if the N output
states are identical to each other, and are said to be
nonsymmetric otherwise. In this work, we shall consider
symmetric 1 → 2 QCM that provides for a (pure) input
state |sa〉 (of qubit a) the two qubits a and b in the
same output state ρouta = ρ
out
b , and where ρ
out denotes
the (reduced) density matrix of the corresponding qubit.
For an ideal transformation, of course, we might expect
|s〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→ |s〉a |s〉b
∣∣Qˇ〉
c
, (1)
i.e. that the input and output states of qubit a are the
same, |sa〉 = |s′a〉, but this would be in conflict with the
non-cloning theorem mentioned above. In the transfor-
mation (1), as usual, we here suppose that the qubit b
was initially prepared in the state |0〉b and that the state
vectors |Q〉c and
∣∣Qˇ〉
c
denote the initial and final states
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of the corresponding cloning device. In order to charac-
terize the ‘quality’ of a cloning device, we shall often use
below the fidelity
F =
〈
s|ρout | s〉 , (2)
between the input and output state (of qubit a), which
takes the values 0 ≤ F ≤ 1 and where F = 1 refers to
the case that ρout ≡ |s〉 〈s|.
Several QCM’s have been discussed in the literature
before [4–7]; Buzˇek and Hillery [5], for example, worked
out a symmetric 1 → 2 QCM that provides copies with
the fidelity F = 5/6 ≈ 0.83 independent of the given
input state. This state-independent transformation,
which is now known as universal QCM, has found re-
cent attention and application in quantum cryptography,
namely, in optimal eavesdropping attack [8] within the
six-state protocol [9]. For some protocols in quantum
cryptography, however, only few states {|sa〉} are (pre-)
selected from the Bloch sphere and, hence, one may wish
to find a state-dependent QCM that provides copies with
higher fidelity than the universal Buzˇek-Hillery machine
for this particular set of states.
The best-known example of such a state-dependent
QCM is equatorial (or phase-covariant) QCM [7]. This
QCM provides copies with fidelity F = 1/2 +
√
1/8 ≈
0.85 for all states which are taken from the equatorial
plane of the Bloch sphere. Equatorial QCM has also
found a remarkable application in quantum cryptogra-
phy, since it can be used to improve the efficiency of
an eavesdropping attack within the BB84 protocol [10].
While, in fact, only four states (from the equatorial
plane) are used in order to encode the information in the
BB84 protocol, equatorial QCM enables an eavesdropper
to obtain copies of these states with the highest fidelity,
if compared with any other known QCM [4].
In this work, we here present and discuss another ex-
ample of state-dependent QCM — a (meridional) QCM
that provides copies with high-fidelity 0.9 ≤ F ≤ 0.95
2for all states along a given half-circle (the ‘Eastern’
meridian) of the Bloch sphere, that includes three states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉} which define this meridian uniquely. This
newly suggested QCM is constructed to be optimal for
copying of all input states from the meridian. We also
analyze how this newly suggested QCM can be applied
in quantum cryptography for the eavesdropping within
Bennett’s B92 quantum key distribution protocol [11].
It is shown, in particular, that this transformation pro-
vides a substantial higher success rate than obtained for
a universal or equatorial quantum copying.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, let us first introduce and discuss the general form of
symmetric 1→ 2 cloning transformations. In particular,
here we shall analyze the Buzˇek-Hillery-type transforma-
tions [5] which can be utilized for both, a state-dependent
and state-independent (symmetric) copying of quantum
states. By making use of some additional parameter in
the definition of the cloning transformation (when com-
pared to Ref. [5]), we then present a QCM in Subsec-
tion II B which enables one to produce for a selected set
of pure input states from the Bloch sphere copies with
higher fidelity than it can be obtained for universal or
equatorial quantum copying. The QCM is than defined,
in Subsection II C, to be optimal for copying states from
chosen meridian of the Bloch sphere. Below, there-
fore, we will refer to this cloning transformation as a
meridional QCM, even if the particular region of high-
fidelity cloning can be chosen rather freely by adapting
just three parameters in the given cloning transforma-
tion. In Subsection IID we present explicit form of
the meridional cloning transformation and recall proper-
ties of it. In Section III, we later analyze for this new
QCM the success (or failure) of an potential eavesdropper
within Bennett’s B92 protocol [11] for the distribution of
quantum keys. In this section, emphasis is placed espe-
cially on the question how efficient such an eavesdropper
can attack the transmission of quantum information; in
our discussion below, this will be quantified by means
of the mutual information between the eavesdropper and
the legitim user as well as the discrepancy of a qubit
(if compared with the originally transmitted one) after
a corresponding attack has been made. Finally, a few
conclusions are drawn in Section IV.
II. QUANTUM CLONING FOR A
RESTRICTED SET OF INPUT STATES
A. General symmetric 1→ 2 cloning
transformations
To introduce some notations that are necessary for our
discussion below, let us start from a single qubit a whose
(pure) states can be written in the Bloch sphere represen-
tation as |s〉a = cos θ2 |0〉a + sin θ2eiφ |1〉a, and with |0〉a
and |1〉a being the standard (computational) basis states.
In this representation, the parameters θ and φ take their
values from 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ < 2pi, respectively,
and we shall often use this Bloch sphere (picture) in or-
der to visualize the states of interest. Moreover, let us
refer to the intersection of the Bloch sphere with the x-
z plane as the main circle, so that all states from this
intersection can be parameterized by means of just the
(single) parameter θ as
|s〉a = cos
θ
2
|0〉a ± sin
θ
2
|1〉a . (3)
While, in this expression, the ‘+’ sign refers to the right
(Eastern) meridian of the main circle and includes for
θ = pi/2 also the diagonal state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
the ‘–’ sign is associated with its left (Western) meridian
and includes the state |−〉. For the sake of simplicity in
visualizing the different states on the Bloch sphere, we
shall sometimes use also this ‘geographical’ notation in
our discussion below.
Although the state |s〉a of a given qubit will be typi-
cally in a superposition of the two basis states |0〉a and
|1〉a, it is of course sufficient to know the transforma-
tion of just the basis in order to obtain a proper copying
of states. Therefore, the most general (1 → 2) quantum
cloning transformation for the state of qubit a upon qubit
b can be cast into the form
|0〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→
1∑
m,n=0
|m〉a |n〉b |Qmn〉c ,
|1〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→
1∑
m,n=0
|m〉a |n〉b
∣∣∣Q˜mn〉
c
, (4)
where |Q〉c denotes the initial state of the cloning ap-
paratus, and where we have assumed — without loss of
generality — that the second qubit b was prepared ini-
tially in the basis state |0〉b. Once, the transformation
has been performed, |m〉a and |n〉b denote the output
basis states of the two copies, while |Qmn〉c and
∣∣∣Q˜mn〉
c
are the corresponding states of the apparatus. As seen
from the transformation (4), here we do not assume any
additional condition for the final states of the cloning
apparatus. However, in order to ensure that the trans-
formation (4) is unitary,
∑
i
ci |i〉ab |Q〉c −→
∑
i,λ
ciUiλ |λ〉abc , (5)
for all possible input states, i.e. for |i〉ab = {|0〉a |0〉b ,|1〉a |0〉b}, the final states of the apparatus must fulfill
certain requirements [12].
In Eq. (5), the three-partite basis {|λ〉abc} refers to a
complete and orthonormal basis for the overall system
‘qubits a,b + apparatus’. Thus, the requested unitarity
3UU † = 1 of the transformation (4) implies the conditions
1∑
m,n=0
〈Qmn | Qmn〉 =
1∑
m,n=0
〈
Q˜mn | Q˜mn
〉
= 1 ,
1∑
m,n=0
〈
Qmn | Q˜mn
〉
= 0 . (6)
For any explicit construction of a (1 → 2) quantum
cloning transformation, we must therefore ‘determine’
the final states |Qmn〉c and
∣∣∣Q˜mn〉
c
of the apparatus in
line with the conditions (6). These state vectors then
define the QCM uniquely.
Before we shall construct QCM with some particular
properties, let us consider the simplest case of such a
transformation (4) as first suggested by Wootters and
Zurek [1]
|0〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→ |0〉a |0〉b |Q00〉c ,
|1〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→ |1〉a |1〉b
∣∣∣Q˜11〉
c
. (7)
In this transformation, obviously, only a single term is re-
tained from the summations on the right-hand side (rhs)
of Eqs. (4), i.e. the term with m = n = 0 in the first
and m = n = 1 in the second line. No further free-
dom remains in the set-up of this transformation since
the unitarity conditions (6) then require 〈Q00 | Q00〉 =
〈Q11 | Q11〉 = 1. As seen from Eq. (7), moreover, the
Wootters-Zurek transformation is symmetric with regard
to an interchange of the basis states |0〉a ↔ |1〉a and this
implies that the same symmetry helds also for the state
of the two copies ρouta and ρ
out
b , i.e. ρ
out
a = ρ
out
b . For the
Wootters-Zurek transformation, furthermore, the fidelity
between the input state (from the main cirlce) and the
corresponding output is given by
F (θ) = 1− 1
2
sin2 θ . (8)
Therefore, this particular transformation can provide an
‘exact’ copy with fidelity F (0) = F (pi) = 1 just for the
basis states |0〉 and |1〉 , i.e. the two ‘poles’ of the Bloch
sphere, while the fidelity drops down to F (pi
2
) = 1/2 for
all states along the equator and, especially, for the two
diagonal states |±〉 . For this reason, the Wootters-
Zurek transformation appears to be of little help if one
wishes to copy (unknown) states other than the basis
states themselves.
B. Cloning transformations of Buzˇek-Hillery type
Additional terms in the cloning transformation (4)
need to be considered if we wish to construct a QCM
that supports an equal-fidelity cloning for all states on
the Bloch sphere, or which improves the fidelity between
the input and output states for certain regions on this
sphere. For example, Buzˇek and Hillery [5] have ana-
lyzed in quite detail the three-term transformation
|0〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→ |0〉a |0〉b |Q0〉c
+ [|0〉a |1〉b + |1〉a |0〉b] |Y0〉c , (9)
|1〉a |0〉b |Q〉c −→ |1〉a |1〉b |Q1〉c
+ [|0〉a |1〉b + |1〉a |0〉b] |Y1〉c , (10)
which takes into account two additional terms (com-
pared with the Wootters-Zurek transformation (7)) and
which gives us further freedom in choosing the final
states of the cloning apparatus. To follow the nota-
tion by Buzˇek and Hillery [5], here we have introduced
|Q0〉 ≡ |Q00〉, |Y0〉 ≡ |Q01〉 = |Q10〉, |Q1〉 ≡
∣∣∣Q˜11〉, and
|Y1〉 ≡
∣∣∣Q˜01〉 = ∣∣∣Q˜10〉 to denote the final states of the
apparatus. Again, in order to ensure the symmetry with
regard to an interchange |0〉a ↔ |1〉a of the basis states
of qubit a, we have assumed conditions |Q01〉 = |Q10〉
and
∣∣∣Q˜01〉 = ∣∣∣Q˜10〉 for the final states of the cloning
apparatus.
Eqs. (9)-(10) can be utilized to define cloning trans-
formations for which the fidelity between the input and
output states is either state-independent or depends ex-
plicity on the given input. This behaviour depends on the
additional restriction we shall place on the final states of
the apparatus, beside of the unitarity conditions (5). For
the sake of simplicity, let us omit in the following the
indices a, b and c of the individual subsystems but keep
in mind that |kl〉 ≡ |k〉a |l〉b always refers to the state of
the two copies to be created, and that the vectors |Qi〉
and |Yi〉 belong to the cloning apparatus. With this
change in the notation, we find from Eqs. (6) that the
final-state vectors of the apparatus in the Buzˇek-Hillery
transformation must satisfy the conditions
〈Qi | Qi〉+ 2 〈Yi | Yi〉 = 1 , for i = 0, 1 ; (11)
〈Y0 | Y1〉 = 0 , (12)
in order to ensure the unitarity of the transformation.
For a general (pure) input state (3) from the main circle,
the QCM (9)-(10) then gives rise to the two-qubit density
operator ρoutab which contain 14 scalar products between
the final-state vectors from the apparatus. Each scalar
product introduces a (complex) parameter for the Buzˇek-
Hillery transformation (9)-(10). This gives rise to a total
of 14 parameters for the quantum cloning transformation
(9)-(10), while only the 3 restrictions (11)-(12) need to
be fulfilled due to the unitarity of the transformation.
Further conditions must therefore be formulated in or-
der to define the QCM properly. For example, we may
choose all scalar products to be real and also request that
the two final-state vectors |Y0〉 and |Y1〉 have an equal
norm
〈Y0 | Y0〉 = 〈Y1 | Y1〉 ≡ ζ . (13)
4Under these conditions, Eq. (11) takes the same form for
i = 0 and 1, and hence, 〈Q0 | Q0〉 = 〈Q1 | Q1〉 = 1 − 2ζ.
There are two other conditions that can be obtained from
Eqs. (11)-(12) by using the restriction (13), namely,
〈Y0 | Q1〉 = 〈Y1 | Q0〉 ≡ η/2 , (14)
〈Q1 | Y1〉 = 〈Q0 | Y0〉 ≡ κ/2 . (15)
With these additional notations and conditions, we have
arrived at the final-state density matrix ρoutab of the trans-
formation (9)-(10) that now depends only on three real
parameters. This is quite in contrast to the original work
of Buzˇek and Hillery [5] who assumed the final states
of the apparatus 〈Qi | Yi〉 = 0 to be pairwise orthogo-
nal to each other for the cloning of the two basis states
|i〉 , i = 0, 1. While the condition (15) introduces a
nonorthogonality between the final states of the appa-
ratus, three parameters ζ, η and κ enables us to provide
high-fidelity copies for a region of input states from the
Bloch sphere. However, the three parameters ζ, η and κ
are not completely independent of each other but must
fulfill the three inequalities
0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1
2
, (16)
0 ≤ η ≤ 2
√
ζ(1 − 2ζ) , (17)
0 ≤ κ ≤ 2
√
ζ(1 − 2ζ) . (18)
due to Schwarz’ inequality for the state vectors of the
cloning apparatus.
Using the final-state density matrix ρoutab for the trans-
formation (9)-(10), it is simple to show that the reduced
density operator
ρ out =
(
cos2
θ
2
− ζ cos θ
)
|0〉 〈0|
+
1
2
(κ± η sin θ) (|0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈0|)
+
(
sin2
θ
2
+ ζ cos θ
)
|1〉 〈1| , (19)
is the same for both subsystems a and b, that is ρout ≡
Tra (ρab) = Trb (ρab). We can utilize this expression
(19) to calculate also the fidelity between the input and
output for all states |s〉a = cos θ2 |0〉a ± sin θ2 |1〉a along
the main circle
F (θ) ≡ 〈s|ρout | s〉
= (1− ζ) − 1
2
(1− η − 2ζ) sin2 θ ± κ
2
sin θ .(20)
Although the parameters ζ, η and κ are restricted by the
inequalities (16)-(17), it is this freedom in choosing these
parameters that enables us to optimize the fidelity F (θ)
for certain (regions of) states. Since κ has a different
sign for the two parts of the main circle, a nonzero value
this parameter leads to a quite different behavior of the
fidelity along the Western and Eastern meridian:the high
fidelity along the Eastern meridian correspond to posi-
tive parameter κ, while the high fidelity along the West-
ern meridian is achieved for negative κ. So, for proper
values of ζ, η and κ we can obtain a high fidelity for one
meridian.
C. Optimization of the cloning transformation
Eq. (20) can be applied to determine an ‘optimal’ set
of parameters, either for a few selected input states or
for a whole region of states from the Bloch sphere. Gen-
eral method for optimization of parameters of the uni-
tary transformation was developed in Ref. [13] and was
successfully applied to show optimality of some cloning
transformations [14]. The optimal cloning transforma-
tion maximizes average single-clone fidelity
F =
∫
Ω
dθ
N
F (θ) (21)
for chosen region of states Ω on the Bloch sphere, where
N is the normalization factor. Substituting in this ex-
pression the fidelity function (20) and integrating over
all states from Eastern meridian of the Bloch sphere, we
obtain average fidelity as function of the parameters ζ, η
and κ, i.e.
F =
∫ pi
0
dθ
pi
F (θ) =
1
4
(
3− 2ζ + η + 4κ
pi
)
. (22)
Following numerical optimization procedure over the
three parameters, which are restricted with inequalities
(16)-(17), gives values
κ =
2
5
, ζ =
1
10
, η =
2
5
, (23)
approximately, that correspond to the maximal average
fidelity F ≈ 0.927.
There is, however, another way to perform optimiza-
tion of the fidelity function (20) that does not require
numerical calculations. It is known that parameters of
universal QCM can be found from the requirement of
optimal copying of just the discrete set of six states that
lie on x, y and z axis of the Bloch sphere [4]. Similarly
the requirement of optimal copying of four states that lie
on x and y axis of the sphere is sufficient to determine
equatorial QCM. We may, for example, request an equal
and maximum fidelity for just three selected states from
the meridian in order to determine optimal parameters
of the cloning transformation (9)-(10). If the input |s〉 is
taken from the set of the three states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉} and
we request an equal-fidelity cloning of them, the max-
imum fidelity F = 0.90 is obtained for the parameters
(23). This result is not surprising since the fidelity has
local minima for the states |0〉 , |1〉 and |+〉; that is the
main reason of optimization with this three states. In
fact, in this optimization procedure we restricted the fi-
delity function (20) downwards.
5D. Explicit form and properties of the cloning
transformation
With the help of the parameters (23) the final-state
vectors of the apparatus can be defined as
|Y0〉 =
{
1√
10
, 0
}
, |Y1〉 =
{
0,
1√
10
}
,
|Q0〉 =
{√
2
5
,
√
2
5
}
, |Q1〉 =
{√
2
5
,
√
2
5
}
, (24)
in line with the conditions (11)-(12) and (13)-(15) from
above. These four vectors span only a two-dimensional
subspace within the (four-dimensional) space of the gen-
eral copying machine (4). If we introduce the orthogonal
basis |0〉 and |1〉 for this subspace, the transformation
(9)-(10) can be brought into the form
|0〉 |0〉 |Q〉 −→
√
2
5
|00〉 (|0〉+ |1〉)
+
1√
10
(|01〉+ |10〉) |0〉 , (25)
|1〉 |0〉 |Q〉 −→
√
2
5
|11〉 (|0〉+ |1〉)
+
1√
10
(|01〉+ |10〉) |1〉 , (26)
if the vectors (24) are substituted into the transformation
(9)-(10). This makes our suggested QCM now explicit.
The QCM (25)-(26) is optimal for a symmetric hight-
fidelity cloning of the states from Eastern meridian.
If we substitute the parameters (23) into this formula,
the input-output fidelity for the states from the main
circle becomes
F (θ) =
9
10
− 1
5
sin2 θ ± 1
5
sin θ . (27)
Figure 1 displays the behavior of this fidelity for the two
meridians of the main circle. While the fidelity is F ≥
0.9 for all states along the Eastern meridian (associated
with the + sign in Eq. (27)), it drops quickly down up to
F = 1/2 for the |−〉 state along the Western meridian.
Along the Eastern part, that includes the three states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉} from above, however, a remarkably small
variation of the fidelity with 0.9 ≤ F ≤ 0.95 occurs and
may favor this region to produce quantum copies with
high fidelity.
So far, we have considered input states from the main
circle for the transformation (25)-(26). If we apply this
transformation to other (pure) states from the Bloch
sphere |s〉a = cos θ2 |0〉a + sin θ2eiφ |1〉a with φ 6= 0, the
fidelity
F (θ, φ) =
9
10
− 1
5
sin θ (sin θ − cosφ) , (28)
becomes dependent on the angle φ also and makes the be-
havior slightly more complex. Note that this particular
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Θ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
FHΘL
FIG. 1: Fidelity (27) of the quantum cloning transformation
(25)-(26) as function of the angle θ. The fidelity between the
input and output states are shown for the states (3) from
the main circle; Eastern meridian (solid line) and Western
meridian (dashed line). See text for further discussion.
dependence (28) of the fidelity was obtained from the re-
quest that the states from Eastern meridian can be copied
in optimal way. By making similar requirements for other
meridians on the Bloch sphere, a high-fidelity cloning is
possible also for this regions on the Bloch sphere.
III. APPLYING THE MERIDIONAL QCM FOR
EAVESDROPPING
Although an eavesdropping of the (quantum) commu-
nication between two partners, say Alice and Bob, might
be seriously hampered by the well-known impossibility
to produce exact clones of quantum information (non-
cloning theorem), the generation of high-fidelity copies
may enlarge the success rate for such an attack. It is
therefore worth to know for both, the two partners who
wish to communicate as well as for a potential eavesdrop-
per, how much our suggested (meridional) QCM (25)-
(26) will affect Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pro-
tocols. In this Section, we shall therefore analyze with
which success (or failure) an potential eavesdropper, say
Eve, may attack Bennett’s B92 protocol [11].
In the B92 protocol, only two nonorthogonal quantum
states are utilized in order to encode and transmit the
information about the cryptographic key. As usual, we
suppose that the information is sent from Alice to Bob
by means of a quantum communication channel. At the
beginning of the key distribution protocol, Alice encodes
each logical bit, 0 or 1, into two nonorthogonal states,
that can be parameterized in computational basis with
6single parameter ϑ [15] as
|u〉 = cos ϑ
2
|0〉+ sin ϑ
2
|1〉 ,
|v〉 = sin ϑ
2
|0〉+ cos ϑ
2
|1〉 . (29)
The overlap of the states O(ϑ) ≡ | 〈u | v〉 |2 = sin2 ϑ gives
the distance between states |u〉 and |v〉 in geometric sense.
These qubits are then sent to Bob who performs a posi-
tive operator-valued measurement (POVM), and the best
operators for that are [15]
G1 =
1
1 + 〈u | v〉 (1− |u〉 〈u|) , (30)
G2 =
1
1 + 〈u | v〉 (1− |v〉 〈v|) , (31)
G3 = 1−G1 −G2 . (32)
Only measurements with POVM elements G1 and G2
are conclusive, because certain conclusion about received
state |u〉 or |v〉 can be made after the measurement. Af-
ter all the qubits have been sent (and measured), Bob
tells to Alice numbers of conclusive measurements via a
public channel, which can be monitored but not modified
by possible eavesdropper. Only those bits (obtained in
Bob’s conclusive measurements) can be used to construct
the key, while all the rest need to be discarded because
no definite conclusion can be drawn from the outcome of
Bob’s measurement. To test and recognize a (possible)
eavesdropper, Alice and Bob compare moreover the val-
ues of some of their bits via the public channel in order
to get an estimate how likely their communication was
disturbed.
In practice, a disturbance in the transmission of a (se-
cret) key can have very different reasons. Apart from an
eavesdropper, the quantum control during the prepara-
tion or transmission of the qubits might be incomplete
for a given realization of the quantum channel. For all
practical realizations of QKD protocols, therefore, a cer-
tain error rate (disturbance) need to be accepted, and an
eavesdropper might be successful in extracting informa-
tion even if the protocol is inherently secure in the ideal
case. To quantify the disturbance in the transmission of
a single qubit, a convenient measure is the probability
that Alice and Bob detect an error. If Bob would know
the state |s〉 of one or several qubits in advance, that
were sent to him by Alice, he could easily test for a possi-
ble eavesdropping attack. In this case, he will receive in
general the qubits no longer in a pure but a mixed state
that has to be described in terms of its density matrix ρ.
The discrepancy that is detected by Bob is given by
D = 1 − 〈s | ρ|s〉 . (33)
Since Bob knows the maximal discrepancy Dmax for the
given channel (due to the incomplete quantum control of
the given transmission), he could recognize an eavesdrop-
ping attack for D > Dmax and discard the key accord-
ingly.
A central question for Eve is of how much information
she can extract from the transmission of the key if the
disturbance due to his attack should beD < Dmax. From
the initial agreement between Alice and Bob about the
basis states which are to be chosen randomly, Eve might
know that Alice prepares the qubits in one of the two
states (29) with probability pi = 1/2 (i = 0, 1). Before
Eve has measured a given qubit, her (degree of) ignorance
is given by Shannon’s entropy H = −∑ pi log2 pi =
− log2(1/2). After the measurement, she increased her
knowledge about the system by decreasing this entropy,
a measure that is called the mutual information that Eve
has acquired due to the measurement. Obviously, Eve
will try to obtain as much information as possible keeping
the discrepancy D < Dmax.
In order to discuss how much Eve will affect the trans-
mission (and thus increase her knowledge about the
transmitted information), we must specify the circum-
stances under which the eavesdropping attack is made.
Let us suppose that Eve performs incoherent (i.e. in-
dividual) attack on the communication channel with a
QCM. Here, we shall not yet specify the QCM explicitly
in order to enable us to compare different QCM’s be-
low. According to the incoherent strategy, Eve will copy
(attack) each qubit independently as they are sent from
Alice to Bob. As output of her cloning transformation,
she then obtains two copies of one of the two possible
states ρ|u〉 and ρ|v〉 (which just correspond to the two
input states (29)) with a fidelity as defined by the given
QCM. While Eve transmits one of her copies further to
Bob, she could measure the second copy following the
same procedure as Bob.
To calculate the mutual information between Alice and
Eve that is to be extracted from the eavesdropping, we
can follow the procedure as described in Ref. [16] and [17].
Using the POVM elements (30)-(32), the probability for
Eve to obtain the outcome µ is
Pµi = Tr(Gµρi) , (34)
and where the operators ρi refer to the two possible states
{ρ|u〉, ρ|v〉} of her copy. After the measurement, when
she has obtained a particular outcome µ, the posterior
probability Qiµ that ρi was prepared by Alice is
Qiµ =
Pµipi
qµ
, (35)
where qµ =
∑
j Pµjpj , and pj = 1/2 is the probability
for sending the states |u〉 and |v〉 within the B92
protocol. With these probabilities, the Shannon entropy
(which was H = − log2(1/2) = 1 initially), becomes
Hµ = −
∑
i
Qiµ logQiµ , (36)
once the result µ was obtained, and hence the mutual
information is
I = H −
∑
µ
qµHµ . (37)
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FIG. 2: The mutual information between Alice and Eve I(O)
as function of the overlap O of the states (29) for eavesdrop-
ping with meridional (solid), equatorial (dashed) and univer-
sal (dotted) QCM’s.
To determine the possible success of an eavesdropper,
we only need to analyze the explicit form of the output
states ρ|u〉 and ρ|v〉 for a particular QCM. By substituting
the output states into Eqns. (37) and (33) we may then
calculate the mutual information and discrepancy in case
of an eavesdropping with the QCM. Since the copies
from the QCM are symmetric, the mutual information
extracted by Eve IAE equals to the mutual information
obtained by Bob in his measurements IAB = IAE ≡ I
and, obviously, depends from the overlap of the states
(29).
If Eve applies universal QCM, which provides copies
with fidelity F = 5/6, she causes discrepancy D =
1/6 ≈ 0.17 independently from the choice of the states
(29). The mutual information extracted by Eve is given
at Fig. 2 with dotted line. For equatorial QCM with the
fidelity F = 1/2+
√
1/8 of the copies, discrepancy equals
D = 1/2−
√
1/8 ≈ 0.15 for arbitrary states (29) and the
mutual information is shown at Fig. 2 with dashed line.
For the eavesdropping withmeridional QCM discrepancy
depends from particular choice of the states (29) and is
given with inequality 0.05 ≤ D ≤ 0.10. The mutual in-
formation in this case is shown at Fig. 2 with solid line.
Apparently, our suggested QCM introduces a lower dis-
turbance into the data transmission between Alice and
Bob than it is caused by universal or equatorial QCM’s.
It also enables Eve to extract in course of her eavesdrop-
ping more information than obtained by means of these
two QCM’s.
Suggested meridional QCM as well as universal and
equatorial QCM’s belongs to the class of QCM’s with
an axillary system [4]. There are, however, several pro-
posals of optimal cloning transformations without any
axillary system [4, 18, 19]. It is, of course, important
to compare efficiencies of the eavesdropping with merid-
ional QCM and the best QCM without the axillary sys-
tems. Optimal cloning transformation that clone at best
two arbitrary pure states of a qubit was developed in
Refs. [18, 19]. This transformation was shown to have
extremely large fidelity 0.987 ≤ F ≤ 1 between the input
and output states. However, in this type of cloning the
copies are strongly entangled. That leads to the fact that
in the eavesdropping with the QCM without the axillary
system, Eve has very poor information about the result
obtained by Bob. Indeed, as the result of Bob’s measure-
ment on received qubit, state of Eve’s qubit reduces to
strongly mixed state. In fact, presence of the axillary sys-
tem is necessary to eavesdrop efficiently a QKD protocol
based on single-qubit states [4].
General question arises now, whether the incoherent
eavesdropping attack with meridional QCM discussed
above is optimal within B92 QKD protocol? To answer
the question, we need to analyze the success of the eaves-
dropper in line of alternative incoherent attacks as well as
alternative strategy for eavesdropping, namely, coherent
( or collective) attack when the eavesdropper has oppor-
tunity to perform collective measurements on intercepted
qubits. Several incoherent attacks on the protocol have
been proposed before [15] such as intercept-resend at-
tack and the attack with entangled probe. It was found
that the efficiency of the eavesdropping depends from the
overlap of the states (29). Recently we showed that for
wide range of the overlap 0.07 ≤ O(ϑ) ≤ 0.50 of the
states |u〉 and |v〉 , the attack with meridional QCM
gives advantage for the eavesdropper to obtain more in-
formation causing less discrepancy than any known in-
coherent attack [20]. For small overlap when the states
are almost orthogonal, however, intercept-resend attack
is optimal; while for large overlap the attack with the en-
tangled probe is optimal (see [20] for further discussion).
Moreover, the eavesdropping with meridional QCM is op-
timal independently from incoherent or coherent strategy
of the eavesdropping, since it was shown that coherent
strategy for the eavesdropping gives negligible small ad-
ditional information comparing to the incoherent strat-
egy in the protocols for quantum key distribution based
on single-qubit states [4, 8].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Unlike the well-known universal [5] and equatorial [7]
quantum cloning, we have presented a QCM that pro-
vides high-fidelity copies for all states from a selected
meridian (i.e. half-circle) of the Bloch sphere. This
(so-called) meridional QCM was constructed to provide
hight-fidelity copies with 0.95 ≥ F ≥ 0.90 for all states
along the Eastern meridian. Although this QCM pro-
vides high-fidelity copies for the Eastern meridian, it can
be applied with little adaptions also to other meridians.
All what is needed to follow the ‘optimization’ procedures
as described in Subsection II C.
The suggested QCM has been applied also to analyze
a possible eavesdropping attack in the data transmission
between Alice and Bob, following Bennett’s B92 QKD
8protocol [11]. From this analysis, it is shown that Eve,
the eavesdropper, can obtain more information from the
meridional than from the universal or equatorial QCM’s.
The probability that Bob (as the legitime user) will de-
tect the attack (0.05 ≤ D ≤ 0.10) is lower for the merid-
ional than in case of the universal (D ≈ 0.17) or equato-
rial (D ≈ 0.15) quantum copying. Moreover, the eaves-
dropping attack with meridional QCM is found to be
optimal for particular choices of states which are used to
encode information in the protocol [20].
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